As the military situation in New York worsened in October with most of Washington’s troops leaving Manhattan for West Chester County that would produce the Battle of White Plains at the end of the month, a series of supply magazines were authorized for New Jersey, including a principal one at Trenton. While British actions were not certain, a movement into New Jersey was a definite possibility in the continuing action. Whatever developed, reinforcements for Washington would be travelling through the new state and would need large quantities of food support. General Nathanael Greene determined the number of provisions needed at each post to support those troops.  For the Trenton magazine, Greene recommended 3,000 barrels of flour, 3,000 barrels of beef and pork, 300 tons of hay and 10,000 bushels of grain. He felt these supplies would subsist 20,000 men and accompanying horses for three months. All this took place about the time of the Battle of White Plains on October 28 when it looked like the army might need to retreat to New Jersey.

Although the main military actions had focused so far on New York, General Charles Lee informed Congress on October 12 that he had intelligence that a large contingent of Hessians had been removed from Staten Island and this could be preliminary to an attack on Trenton or Burlington. He stated, “They will infallibly proceed either immediately up the River Delaware with their whole troops or what is more probable, land somewhere about S. Amboy or Shrewsbury and march strait to … Trenton or Burlington.” Washington’s army was not in position to deal with this threat, so “for Heaven’s sake let ten thousand men be immediately assembled and station’d somewhere about Trenton.” Lee said he was on his way to headquarters to communicate his concerns and urged Washington to send troops, if he had any to spare, to help prevent this. Of course, Washington did not have any spare troops, and fortunately the British were not threatening Trenton yet. The people of Trenton, though, were no doubt wondering if, or when, they might be attacked while their militiamen on active duty were primarily in the northeastern part of the state. The Continental Congress resolved on October 14 that some Virginia troops currently on the march to New York should halt at Trenton until further orders. While this might provide some security, it would not only put a strain on the supplies but on everything, and everyone, in Trenton.

Another problem for Trenton was that many of its men were out on duty in the militia during October. John Burroughs of Captain John Mott’s Trenton company went as a volunteer with militia Adjutant Elias Phillips on an “excursion to Staten Island, and surprised and captured a British guard, and brought them to Elizabeth Town as prisoners.” William Reeder, probably also of Mott’s company, was also at Staten Island in the skirmish with some Hessians. The slight variations in the memories of the participants are interesting to consider. The men only seem to recall Hessians being taken prisoner on October 16. This could have been because those opponents were less familiar and more exotic to them. Up to this point, unlike their counterparts in the five-month levies, the militiamen hadn’t had much contact with the Hessians. This would soon change.

On October 19, Mercer wrote to the President of Congress from Perth Amboy that the prisoners taken on the 16th had been sent off to Philadelphia. He noted that General Washington had decided to let some of the Hessian prisoners “escape” so they could distribute “advertisements” drawn up by Congress among their countrymen in the British army. Mercer asked if, since they will get to Philadelphia before the “advertisements” were created, whether they should be allowed a couple of days to get acquainted with local German settlers “who have experienced the advantages of free government, and then to exchange, or induce some of them to return to their corps,” pretending to have escaped from confinement. Clearly the Patriots were working on recruiting Hessians to subvert their units and encourage desertions. Some of the “advertisements” had been sent over to Staten Island a couple of weeks previously, but having active help from some Hessians would make the effort more effective. In addition to the prisoners, Mercer reported that his forces also brought off 30 muskets, four pistols, four short swords, three bayonets, and one Light Horse standard from Staten Island.

Due to their being almost constantly on active duty, in October life was getting very difficult for the Trenton militiamen. On October 21, William Patterson wrote to Governor Livingston explaining his inability to get sufficient supplies of shoes, because his contractors had to serve so frequently in the militia. He asked whether shoemakers, weavers, and tailors could be exempt from militia active duty if they were willing to work for the army. He knew the council had contemplated enacting this, but he wasn’t sure if anything had ever been done about it. He described the hard duty the militia had undergone saying, “Permit me to observe that the Jersey Militia have had very severe Duty, the one half … in Rotation [have] been in Service for two months, to say nothing of the whole militia of the eighteen counties being out for a month or upwards in the beginning of the campaign. They murmur exceedingly.” The men of New Jersey felt put upon because they had supplied about 2000 men for the levies at New York for five months and this should be reason enough to dismiss those remaining on duty in New Jersey. If the five-month levies were not yet at full strength, then the militia in New Jersey should be dismissed immediately after enough men volunteered to complete the 2000. Patterson closed with the request that, “perhaps if your Excellency were to use your Influence, the Militia may be dismissed, which would be very acceptable to the State in general.” Patterson’s letter reveals that increasingly the militiamen struggled with being asked to go beyond the accepted concept that militia duty was for local defense by taking on roles that should be handled by full-time soldiers. The overall effect of all this activity was a labor deficiency in both the military and civilian workforces. This was especially ironic considering that the civilian occupations of the militiamen also helped support the Patriot military forces. All this activity also modified the roles of enslaved people, women, and children to fill in the labor gaps in both the family and community economy.

By the end of October, it was increasingly feared that military activity would soon descend on Trenton, that the militiamen would indeed revert to their expected role as defenders of their homes and community.